Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location von Agrawal, Priyank, Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Ou, Tingting, Tan, Xizhi

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Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Schoepflin, Daniel, Tan, Xizhi

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Mechanism Design with Predictions: An Annotated Reading List von Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare von Garbea, Marius, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions von Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Online Mechanism Design with Predictions von Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi, Zhu, Cherlin

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Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via $(p,q)$-Veto Core von Berger, Ben, Feldman, Michal, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Psomas, Alexandros, Tan, Xizhi, Verma, Paritosh

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Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Schoepflin, Daniel, Tan, Xizhi

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Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Psomas, Alexandros, Tan, Xizhi

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Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Kollias, Kostas, Sgouritsa, Alkmini, Tan, Xizhi

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Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location von Agrawal, Priyank, Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Ou, Tingting, Tan, Xizhi

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Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions von Balkanski, Eric, Garimidi, Pranav, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Schoepflin, Daniel, Tan, Xizhi

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EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare von Garbea, Marius, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via \((p,q)\)-Veto Core von Berger, Ben, Feldman, Michal, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Psomas, Alexandros, Tan, Xizhi, Verma, Paritosh

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Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions von Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi

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Online Mechanism Design with Predictions von Balkanski, Eric, Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Tan, Xizhi, Zhu, Cherlin

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Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Psomas, Alexandros, Tan, Xizhi

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Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions von Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Kollias, Kostas, Sgouritsa, Alkmini, Tan, Xizhi

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