Flexible Moral Hazard Problems von Georgiadis, George, Ravid, Doron, Szentes, Balázs

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Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture von Brzustowski, Thomas, Georgiadis-Harris, Alkis, Szentes, Balázs

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Learning before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information von Ravid, Doron, Roesler, Anne-Katrin, Szentes, Balázs

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Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly von Condorelli, Daniele, Szentes, Balázs

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On the biological foundation of risk preferences von Robatto, Roberto, Szentes, Balázs

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Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition von Gershkov, Alex, Szentes, Balázs

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On the Market for Venture Capital von Jovanovic, Boyan, Szentes, Balázs

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Spontaneous Discrimination von Pȩski, Marcin, Szentes, Balázs

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Equilibrium Default Cycles von Kovrijnykh, Natalia, Szentes, Balázs

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A Biological Theory of Social Discounting von Robson, Arthur J., Szentes, Balázs

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Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing von Roesler, Anne-Katrin, Szentes, Balázs

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Information Design in the Holdup Problem von Condorelli, Daniele, Szentes, Balázs

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On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets von Doval, Laura, Szentes, Balázs

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A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem von Szentes, Balazs, Koriyama, Yukio

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On the coevolution of cooperation and social institutions von Salazar, Verónica, Szentes, Balázs

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Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems von SZENTES, BALÁZS

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Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem von Eső, Péter, Szentes, Balàzs

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Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: Comment von Robson, Arthur J., Szentes, Balázs

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DEFINABLE AND CONTRACTIBLE CONTRACTS von Peters, Michael, Szentes, Balázs

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Development of the PRISM Risk Assessment Method Based on a Multiple AHP-TOPSIS Approach von Bognár, Ferenc, Szentes, Balázs, Benedek, Petra

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