A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Correlation‐savvy sellers von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Collective Brand Reputation von Nocke, Volker, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure von Shin, Dongsoo, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Certification and Market Transparency von STAHL, KONRAD, STRAUSZ, ROLAND

Volltext

Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification von Pollrich, Martin, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Feed-in Subsidies, Taxation, and Inefficient Entry von Antoniou, Fabio, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints von Krähmer, Daniel, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures von Celik, Gorkem, Shin, Dongsoo, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Regulatory Risk Under Optimal Monopoly Regulation von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider von Celik, Gorkem, Shin, Dongsoo, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Delegation and dynamic incentives von Shin, Dongsoo, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation von Fiocco, Raffaele, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Mediated contracts and mechanism design von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers von Krähmer, Daniel, Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights von KRÄHMER, DANIEL, STRAUSZ, ROLAND

Volltext

Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal–agent models von Strausz, Roland

Volltext

Honest certification and the threat of capture von Strausz, Roland

Volltext