Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers von Board, Simon, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Auctions with contingent payments — An overview von Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection von Fuchs, William, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction von Levin, Jonathan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests von Orlov, Dmitry, Zryumov, Pavel, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Persuasion with Multiple Actions von Khantadze, Davit, Kremer, Ilan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Disclosing a Random Walk von KREMER, ILAN, SCHREIBER, AMNON, SKRZYPACZ, ANDRZEJ

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Persuading the Principal to Wait von Orlov, Dmitry, Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Zryumov, Pavel

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A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution von Mitchell, Matthew, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure von Guttman, Ilan, Kremer, Ilan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Limited records and reputation bubbles von Liu, Qingmin, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Selling Information von Hörner, Johannes, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Test Design and Minimum Standards von DeMarzo, Peter M., Kremer, Ilan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Yuliy Sannikov: Winner of the 2016 Clark Medal von Athey, Susan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions von Sannikov, Yuliy, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information von Fuchs, William, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design von DeMarzo, Peter M., Kremer, Ilan, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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RULES WITH DISCRETION AND LOCAL INFORMATION von Bowen, T. Renee, Kreps, David M., Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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Tacit collusion in repeated auctions von Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Hopenhayn, Hugo

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Market Design for AI Algorithms von Banchio, Martino, Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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