Revenue from matching platforms von Marx, Philip, Schummer, James

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Influencing waiting lists von Schummer, James

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Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings von Schummer, James, Velez, Rodrigo A.

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Assignment of Arrival Slots von Schummer, James, Vohra, Rakesh V.

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Incentives in landing slot problems von Schummer, James, Abizada, Azar

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Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation von Schummer, James

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An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid von Bikhchandani, Sushil, de Vries, Sven, Schummer, James, Vohra, Rakesh V.

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Strategy-proof Location on a Network von Schummer, James, Vohra, Rakesh V.

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Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy von Schummer, James, Thomson, William

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On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects von de Vries, Sven, Schummer, James, Vohra, Rakesh V.

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Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies von Schummer, James

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The Role of Characterizations in Market Design von Schummer, James, Serizawa, Shigehiro

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Manipulation through Bribes von Schummer, James

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Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies von Schummer, James

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Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies von Schummer, James

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Bribing and signaling in second price auctions von Eső, Péter, Schummer, James

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Credible deviations from signaling equilibria von Eső, Péter, Schummer, James

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Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency for Small Domains of Preferences over Public Goods von Schummer, James

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Auctions for Procuring Options von Schummer, James, Vohra, Rakesh V

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Constrained egalitarianism: A new solution for claims problems von Chun, Youngsub, Schummer, James, Thomson, William

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