A (Dis-)information Theory of Revealed and Unrevealed Preferences: Emerging Deception and Skepticism via Theory of Mind von Alon, Nitay, Schulz, Lion, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Dayan, Peter

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Strategyproof peer selection using randomization, partitioning, and apportionment von Aziz, Haris, Lev, Omer, Mattei, Nicholas, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Walsh, Toby

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Understanding Mechanism Design-Part 2 of 3: The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism von Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Wooldridge, Michael

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Iterative voting and acyclic games von Meir, Reshef, Polukarov, Maria, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Jennings, Nicholas R.

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Algorithms for strategyproof classification von Meir, Reshef, Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Convergence of Iterative Scoring Rules von Lev, Omer, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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The Distortion of Cardinal Preferences in Voting von Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games von Bachrach, Yoram, Parkes, David C., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem von Zuckerman, Michael, Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Reaching consensus under a deadline von Bannikova, Marina, Dery, Lihi, Obraztsova, Svetlana, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game von Bachrach, Yoram, Elkind, Edith, Malizia, Enrico, Meir, Reshef, Pasechnik, Dmitrii, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Rothe, Jörg, Zuckerman, Michael

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Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis von Bachrach, Yoram, Markakis, Evangelos, Resnick, Ezra, Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Saberi, Amin

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Teaching and leading an ad hoc teammate: Collaboration without pre-coordination von Stone, Peter, Kaminka, Gal A., Kraus, Sarit, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Agmon, Noa

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Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions von Lewenberg, Yoad, Lev, Omer, Bachrach, Yoram, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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On the complexity of achieving proportional representation von Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S., Zohar, Aviv

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Mechanisms for information elicitation von Zohar, Aviv, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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The learnability of voting rules von Procaccia, Ariel D., Zohar, Aviv, Peleg, Yoni, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections von Caragiannis, Ioannis, Covey, Jason A., Feldman, Michal, Homan, Christopher M., Kaklamanis, Christos, Karanikolas, Nikos, Procaccia, Ariel D., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules von Obraztsova, Svetlana, Lev, Omer, Markakis, Evangelos, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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Supporting privacy in decentralized additive reputation systems von PAVLOV, Elan, ROSENSCHEIN, Jeffrey S, TOPOL, Zvi

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