Correlation Misperception in Choice von Ellis, Andrew, Piccione, Michele

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PRICE COMPETITION UNDER LIMITED COMPARABILITY von Plccione, Michele, Spiegler, Ran

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AN APPROACH TO ASSET PRICING UNDER INCOMPLETE AND DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS von Eyster, Erik, Piccione, Michele

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Equilibrium in the Jungle von Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel

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Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs von Ellis, Andrew, Piccione, Michele, Zhang, Shengxing

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Manipulating market sentiment von Piccione, Michele, Spiegler, Ran

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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring von Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele

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The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring von Piccione, Michele

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Is There a Recreational Misuse Potential for Pregabalin? Analysis of Anecdotal Online Reports in Comparison with Related Gabapentin and Clonazepam Data von Schifano, Fabrizio, D’Offizi, Stefano, Piccione, Michele, Corazza, Ornella, Deluca, Paolo, Davey, Zoe, Di Melchiorre, Giuditta, Di Furia, Lucia, Farré, Magí, Flesland, Liv, Mannonen, Miia, Majava, Aino, Pagani, Stefania, Peltoniemi, Teuvo, Siemann, Holger, Skutle, Arvid, Torrens, Marta, Pezzolesi, Cinzia, van der Kreeft, Peer, Scherbaum, Norbert

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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring: Efficiency in repeated games von Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele

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The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly von Hendricks, Ken, Piccione, Michele, Tan, Guofu

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The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early von Dekel, Eddie, Piccione, Michele

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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring von Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele

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Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring von Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele

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Coalition formation under power relations von Razin, Ronny, Piccione, Michele

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Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions von Piccione, Michele, Tan, Guofu

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MODELING THE ECONOMIC INTERACTION OF AGENTS WITH DIVERSE ABILITIES TO RECOGNIZE EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS von Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel

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Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns von Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel

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Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns von Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel

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LUXURY PRICES: AN EXPOSITORY NOTE von PICCIONE, MICHELE, RUBINSTEIN, ARIEL

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