Contagion in Financial Networks von Glasserman, Paul, Young, H. Peyton

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Innovation diffusion in heterogeneous populations: contagion, social influence, and social learning von Young, H. Peyton

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The Evolution of Social Norms von Young, H. Peyton

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dynamics of social innovation von Young, H. Peyton

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THE SPEED OF INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS von Arieli, Itai, Babichenko, Yakov, Peretz, Ron, Young, H. Peyton

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Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks von Kreindler, Gabriel E., Young, H. Peyton

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How likely is contagion in financial networks? von Glasserman, Paul, Young, H. Peyton

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Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games von Marden, Jason R., Young, H. Peyton, Arslan, Gürdal, Shamma, Jeff S.

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How safe are central counterparties in credit default swap markets? von Paddrik, Mark, Young, H. Peyton

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The Evolution of Conventions von Young, H. Peyton

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Learning by trial and error von Young, H. Peyton

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STOCHASTIC LEARNING DYNAMICS AND SPEED OF CONVERGENCE IN POPULATION GAMES von Arieli, Itai, Young, H. Peyton

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The Economics of Convention von Young, H. Peyton

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Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning von Marden, Jason R., Young, H. Peyton, Pao, Lucy Y.

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Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture von Young, H. Peyton, Burke, Mary A.

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Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection von Kreindler, Gabriel E., Young, H. Peyton

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On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents von Foster, Dean P., Young, H. Peyton

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Learning in a black box von Nax, Heinrich H., Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N., West, Stuart A., Young, H. Peyton

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Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems von Pradelski, Bary S.R., Young, H. Peyton

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Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud von Peyton Young, H.

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