The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study von LEVINE, DAVID K., PALFREY, THOMAS R.

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Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment von BATTAGLINI, MARCO, NUNNARI, SALVATORE, PALFREY, THOMAS R.

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Bayesian Implementation von Palfrey, Thomas R

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Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy von Palfrey, Thomas R.

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The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study von Battaglini, Marco, Nunnari, Salvatore, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited von Battaglini, Marco, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study von Agranov, Marina, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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The effects of income mobility and tax persistence on income redistribution and inequality von Agranov, Marina, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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COMMUNICATION AMONG VOTERS BENEFITS THE MAJORITY PARTY von Palfrey, Thomas R., Pogorelskiy, Kirill

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Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments von Battaglini, Marco, Nunnari, Salvatore, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium von Holt, Charles A., Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections von Battaglini, Marco, Morton, Rebecca B., Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study von GROßER, JENS, PALFREY, THOMAS R.

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Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study von Casella, Alessandra, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Ignorance and bias in collective decisions von Elbittar, Alexander, Gomberg, Andrei, Martinelli, César, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study von Battaglini, Marco, Nunnari, Salvatore, Palfrey, Thomas R

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Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions von Camerer, Colin, Nunnari, Salvatore, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games von McKelvey, Richard D., Palfrey, Thomas R.

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Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory von BATTAGLINI, MARCO, MORTON, REBECCA B, PALFREY, THOMAS R

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Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees von Ali, S. Nageeb, Goeree, Jacob K., Kartik, Navin, Palfrey, Thomas R.

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