Stationary Social Learning in a Changing Environment von Levy, Raphaël, Pęski, Marcin, Vieille, Nicolas

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Tractable Model of Dynamic Many-to-Many Matching von Pęski, Marcin

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Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility von Pęski, Marcin

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VALUE OF PERSISTENT INFORMATION von Pęski, Marcin, Toikka, Juuso

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Value-based distance between information structures von Gensbittel, Fabien, Pęski, Marcin, Renault, Jérôme

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Bargaining with Mechanisms von Pȩski, Marcin

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An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring von Peski, Marcin

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Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games von Peski, Marcin

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A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes von Wiseman, Thomas, Peski, Marcin

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Critical Types von ELY, JEFFREY C., PĘSKI, MARCIN

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Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting von Peski, Marcin

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Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting: Repeated games with incomplete information von Pęski, Marcin

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Spontaneous Discrimination von Pȩski, Marcin, Szentes, Balázs

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Corrigendum to “Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics” [J. Econ. Theory 145 (1) (2010) 216–248] von Eguia, Jon X., Pęski, Marcin

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An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring: Anti-folk theorem in repeated games von Pęski, Marcin

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A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes: A folk theorem for stochastic games von Pęski, Marcin, Wiseman, Thomas

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Fuzzy Conventions von Pęski, Marcin

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The Principal-Agent Approach to Testing Experts von Olszewski, Wojciech, Pęski, Marcin

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Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics von Peski, Marcin

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Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization von Marcin, Pe[combining cedilla]ski

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