Effort of rugby teams according to the bonus point system: a theoretical and empirical analysis von Fioravanti, Federico, Tohmé, Fernando, Delbianco, Fernando, Neme, Alejandro

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Order-k rationality von Barberà, Salvador, de Clippel, Geoffroy, Neme, Alejandro, Rozen, Kareen

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On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game von Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Neme, Alejandro, Massó, Jordi

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The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model von Martínez, Ruth, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro, Oviedo, Jorge

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On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness von Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof von Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous von Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria von Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem von Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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The division problem under constraints von Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness von Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency von Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem von Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings von Martínez, Ruth, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro, Oviedo, Jorge

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The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria von Jaume, Daniel, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition von Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles von Martínez, Ruth, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro, Oviedo, Jorge

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The division problem with voluntary participation von Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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Bribe-proof rules in the division problem von Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof von Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro

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