Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

Computing Pareto-Optimal and Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

Computing Pareto-Optimal and Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Matrix Games Repeated Until Collision von Murhekar, Aniket, Sharma, Eklavya

Volltext bestellen

Automated Recurrence Analysis for Almost-Linear Expected-Runtime Bounds von Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Fu, Hongfei, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext bestellen

Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext bestellen

New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext

On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies von Akrami, Hannaneh, Chaudhury, Bhaskar Ray, Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext bestellen

Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Matrix Games Repeated Until Collision von Murhekar, Aniket, Sharma, Eklavya

Volltext

(Almost) Envy-Free, Proportional and Efficient Allocations of an Indivisible Mixed Manna von Livanos, Vasilis, Mehta, Ruta, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext bestellen

Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext bestellen

Dynamic Vector Bin Packing for Online Resource Allocation in the Cloud von Murhekar, Aniket, Arbour, David, Mai, Tung, Rao, Anup

Volltext bestellen

On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Public Goods von Garg, Jugal, Kulkarni, Pooja, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext bestellen

Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext

Tractable Fragments of the Maximum Nash Welfare Problem von Garg, Jugal, Husić, Edin, Murhekar, Aniket, Végh, László

Volltext bestellen

Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores von Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket, Qin, John

Volltext

On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies von Akrami, Hannaneh, Chaudhury, Bhaskar Ray, Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext

(Almost) Envy-Free, Proportional and Efficient Allocations of an Indivisible Mixed Manna von Livanos, Vasilis, Mehta, Ruta, Murhekar, Aniket

Volltext