Uncertainty, Investment and Productivity with Relational Contracts von Malcomson, James M

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RELATIONAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH PERSISTENT PRIVATE INFORMATION von Malcomson, James M.

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Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit  providers von Besley, Timothy, Malcomson, James M.

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Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks von Malcomson, James M.

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Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US von Malcomson, James M., Mavroeidis, Sophocles

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General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy von Malcomson, James M, Maw, James W, McCormick, Barry

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Relational contracts and specific training von Malcomson, James M.

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Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model von Malcomson, James M.

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Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets von Malcomson, James M.

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Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment von MacLeod, W. Bentley, Malcomson, James M.

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Health Service Gatekeepers von Malcomson, James M.

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Principal and Expert Agent von Malcomson, James M

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Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle von Fairburn, James A., Malcomson, James M.

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Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality von Chalkley, Martin, Malcomson, James M.

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Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care von Malcomson, James M.

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Hospital cost differences and payment by results von MALCOMSON, JAMES M.

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Motivation and Markets von MacLeod, W. Bentley, Malcomson, James M.

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Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets von Malcomson, James M.

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Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality von Chalkley, Martin, Malcomson, James M.

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Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts von MacLeod, W. Bentley, Malcomson, James M.

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