Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule von Lederer, Patrick

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Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick

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On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions von Brandt, Felix, Bullinger, Martin, Lederer, Patrick

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Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick, Suksompong, Warut

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Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick, Romen, René

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Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick

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The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations von Frank, Fabian, Lederer, Patrick

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Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules von Dong, Chris, Lederer, Patrick

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Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules von Dong, Chris, Lederer, Patrick

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Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick

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Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick, Suksompong, Warut

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Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results von Aziz, Haris, Lederer, Patrick, Ritossa, Angus

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The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings von Lederer, Patrick, Peters, Dominik, Wąs, Tomasz

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Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick

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The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations von Fabian, Frank, Lederer, Patrick

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Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules von Dong, Chris, Lederer, Patrick

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Sequential Payment Rules: Approximately Fair Budget Divisions via Simple Spending Dynamics von Aziz, Haris, Lederer, Patrick, Lu, Xinhang, Suzuki, Mashbat, Vollen, Jeremy

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Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains von Brand, Felix, Lederer, Patrick, Tausch, Sascha

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Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness von Brandt, Felix, Lederer, Patrick

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Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections von Bullinger, Martin, Dong, Chris, Lederer, Patrick, Mehler, Clara

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