Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market von Lavi, Ron, Sattath, Or, Zohar, Aviv

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Levantine cranium from Manot Cave (Israel) foreshadows the first European modern humans von Hershkovitz, Israel, Marder, Ofer, Ayalon, Avner, Bar-Matthews, Miryam, Yasur, Gal, Boaretto, Elisabetta, Caracuta, Valentina, Alex, Bridget, Frumkin, Amos, Goder-Goldberger, Mae, Gunz, Philipp, Holloway, Ralph L., Latimer, Bruce, Lavi, Ron, Matthews, Alan, Slon, Viviane, Mayer, Daniella Bar-Yosef, Berna, Francesco, Bar-Oz, Guy, Yeshurun, Reuven, May, Hila, Hans, Mark G., Weber, Gerhard W., Barzilai, Omry

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Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation von Bikhchandani, Sushil, Chatterji, Shurojit, Lavi, Ron, Mu'alem, Ahuva, Nisan, Noam, Sen, Arunava

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Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond von Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Frederiksen, Søren Kristoffer Stiil, Zhang, Jie

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Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming von LAVI, Ron, SWAMY, Chaitanya

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Radiocarbon chronology of Manot Cave, Israel and Upper Paleolithic dispersals von Alex, Bridget, Barzilai, Omry, Hershkovitz, Israel, Marder, Ofer, Berna, Francesco, Caracuta, Valentina, Abulafia, Talia, Davis, Lauren, Goder-Goldberger, Mae, Lavi, Ron, Mintz, Eugenia, Regev, Lior, Bar-Yosef Mayer, Daniella, Tejero, José-Miguel, Yeshurun, Reuven, Ayalon, Avner, Bar-Matthews, Mira, Yasur, Gal, Frumkin, Amos, Latimer, Bruce, Hans, Mark G, Boaretto, Elisabetta

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Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency von Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Lavi, Ron, Shamash, Elisheva

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Job security, stability, and production efficiency von Fu, Hu, Kleinberg, Robert D, Lavi, Ron, Smorodinsky, Rann

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Option Values in Sequential Auctions with Time-Varying Valuations von Ban, Amir, Lavi, Ron

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Technical Note—Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency von Alon, Tal, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Lavi, Ron, Shamash, Elisheva

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Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-Name Manipulation von Gafni, Yotam, Lavi, Ron, Tennenholtz, Moshe

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Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-Name Manipulation von Gafni, Yotam, Lavi, Ron, Tennenholtz, Moshe

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Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items von Lavi, Ron, Nisan, Noam

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Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes von Emek, Yuval, Lavi, Ron, Niazadeh, Rad, Shi, Yangguang

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Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach von Elkind, Edith, Faliszewski, Piotr

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Multi-unit auctions with budget limits von Dobzinski, Shahar, Lavi, Ron, Nisan, Noam

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Principal-agent VCG contracts von Lavi, Ron, Shamash, Elisheva S.

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Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games von Czumaj, Artur, Fasoulakis, Michail, Jurdziński, Marcin

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Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency von Emek, Yuval, Kutten, Shay, Lavi, Ron, Shi, Yangguang

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Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations von Ban, Amir, Lavi, Ron

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