On “Minimal Model Explanations”: A Reply to Batterman and Rice von Lange, Marc

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What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical? von Lange, Marc

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Putting explanation back into “inference to the best explanation” von Lange, Marc

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A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation von Lange, Marc

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Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation von Lange, Marc

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What are explanatory proofs in mathematics and how can they contribute to teaching and learning? von Lange, Marc

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Jeffrey Conditionalization Permits Undermining von Lange, Marc

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Against Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Quality von Lange, Marc

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For Crying Out Loud von Lange, Marc

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A new circularity in explanations by Humean laws of nature von Lange, Marc

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In defense of really statistical explanations von Lange, Marc

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What Would Reasons for Trusting Science Be? von Lange, Marc

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Can Pragmatic Humeanism Account for the Counterfactual Invariance of Natural Laws? von Lange, Marc

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Transitivity, self-explanation, and the explanatory circularity argument against Humean accounts of natural law von Lange, Marc

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Inference to the best explanation as supporting the expansion of mathematicians’ ontological commitments von Lange, Marc

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Inference to the Best Explanation Is an Important Form of Reasoning in Mathematics von Lange, Marc

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Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience von Lange, Marc

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More on Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make: A Reply to Wildman von Lange, Marc

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Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws von Lange, Marc

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Challenges Facing Counterfactual Accounts of Explanation in Mathematics von Lange, Marc

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