Don't blame me: A theory of politicians choosing policy advisors von Fishman, Arthur, Klunover, Doron

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Bureaucracy and labor market inefficiency: A contest model von Klunover, Doron

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Asymmetric technologies in contests von Klunover, Doron

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Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments von Klunover, Doron

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When sabotage fails von Klunover, Doron

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A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests von Klunover, Doron

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Speed limits von Jelnov, Artyom, Klunover, Doron

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Costly expressive voting von Fishman, Arthur, Klunover, Doron

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Contests with a constrained choice set of effort von Klunover, Doron, Morgan, John

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When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict? von Jelnov, Artyom, Klunover, Doron

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Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants von Kahana, Nava, Klunover, Doron

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Gig work: Does it get you more happiness? von Klein, Galit, Klunover, Doron, Shavit, Tal

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Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain von Kahana, Nava, Klunover, Doron

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A note on Poisson contests von Kahana, Nava, Klunover, Doron

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Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation von Kahana, Nava, Klunover, Doron

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Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice von Kahana, Nava, Klunover, Doron

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Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations von Klunover, Doron

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To Act or not to Act? Political competition in the presence of a threat von Fishman, Arthur, Klunover, Doron

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Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations von Klunover, Doron

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A Model of Presidential Debates von Klunover, Doron, Morgan, John

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