Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding von Pal, Saptarshi, Hilbe, Christian

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Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games von Hilbe, Christian, Šimsa, Štěpán, Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Nowak, Martin A.

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Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information von Schmid, Laura, Ekbatani, Farbod, Hilbe, Christian, Chatterjee, Krishnendu

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Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick von Hilbe, Christian, Sigmund, Karl

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Local Replicator Dynamics: A Simple Link Between Deterministic and Stochastic Models of Evolutionary Game Theory von Hilbe, Christian

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Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games von Hilbe, Christian, Nowak, Martin A., Sigmund, Karl

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Indirect reciprocity with stochastic and dual reputation updates von Murase, Yohsuke, Hilbe, Christian

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Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma von Hilbe, Christian, Röhl, Torsten, Milinski, Manfred

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Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas von Hilbe, Christian, Wu, Bin, Traulsen, Arne, Nowak, Martin A.

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Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite von Hilbe, Christian, Traulsen, Arne

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Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations von Murase, Yohsuke, Hilbe, Christian, Baek, Seung Ki

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Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints von Park, Peter S., Nowak, Martin A., Hilbe, Christian

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The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games von Kleshnina, Maria, Hilbe, Christian, Šimsa, Štěpán, Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Nowak, Martin A.

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Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game von LaPorte, Philip, Hilbe, Christian, Nowak, Martin A

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Evolving cooperation in multichannel games von Donahue, Kate, Hauser, Oliver P., Nowak, Martin A., Hilbe, Christian

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Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion von Milinski, Manfred, Hilbe, Christian, Semmann, Dirk, Sommerfeld, Ralf, Marotzke, Jochem

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Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces von Schmid, Laura, Hilbe, Christian, Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Nowak, Martin A

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Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions von Schoenmakers, Sarah, Hilbe, Christian, Blasius, Bernd, Traulsen, Arne

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Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance von Hilbe, Christian, Nowak, Martin A, Traulsen, Arne

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Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment von Hilbe, Christian, Hagel, Kristin, Milinski, Manfred

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