Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals von Heumann, Tibor

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An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals von Heumann, Tibor

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On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games von Heumann, Tibor

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Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint von Heumann, Tibor

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Information, market power, and price volatility von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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Information and volatility von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen, Sorokin, Constantine, Winter, Eyal

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Colloid-colloid hydrodynamic interaction around a bend in a quasi-one-dimensional channel von Liepold, Christopher, Zarcone, Ryan, Heumann, Tibor, Rice, Stuart A, Lin, Binhua

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A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Wang, Michael C

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The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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Screening with Persuasion von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Wang, Michael C

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The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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Screening with Persuasion von Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen

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