COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market von Gonen, Rica, Egri, Ozi

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Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data von Shtechman, Itay, Gonen, Rica, Segal-HaLevi, Erel

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Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets von Gilor, Dvir, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel

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The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings von Gonen, Rica, Lerner, Anat

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Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets von Gilor, Dvir, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel

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Characterizing the incentive compatible and pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, k Items, public budget and quasilinear utilities von Lerner, Anat, Gonen, Rica

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Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants von Feldman, Moran, Gonen, Rica

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Two-Sided Markets: Mapping Social Welfare to Gain from Trade von Gonen, Rica, Egri, Ozi

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Correction to: Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs von Faliszewski, Piotr, Gonen, Rica, Koutecký, Martin, Talmon, Nimrod

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Incentive Compatible Mulit-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach von Buchbinder, Niv, Gonen, Rica

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Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs von Faliszewski, Piotr, Gonen, Rica, KoutecÝ, Martin, Talmon, Nimrod

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Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations von Feldman, Moran, Frim, Gonen, Gonen, Rica

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Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space von Gonen, Rica, Lerner, Anat

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Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions von Lerner, Anat, Gonen, Rica

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Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker von Chen, Yiling, Dimitrov, Stanko, Sami, Rahul, Reeves, Daniel M., Pennock, David M., Hanson, Robin D., Fortnow, Lance, Gonen, Rica

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Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets von Gilor, Dvir, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel

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Heuristics for Opinion Diffusion via Local Elections von Gonen, Rica, Koutecký, Martin, Menashof, Roei, Talmon, Nimrod

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INCREASED EFFICIENCY THROUGH PRICING IN ONLINE LABOR MARKETS von Gonen, Rica, Raban, Daphne, Brady, Colin, Mazor, Maya

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Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets von Gonen, Rica

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Weighted Envy Freeness With Limited Subsidies von Elmalem, Noga Klein, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel

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