Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section von Garvey, Gerald, Milbourn, Todd

Volltext

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad von Garvey, Gerald T., Milbourn, Todd T.

Volltext

Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage von Garvey, Gerald T., Hanka, Gordon

Volltext

Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence von Drago, Robert, Garvey, Gerald T.

Volltext

Discussion of “On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors” von Garvey, Gerald T.

Volltext

Angular correlations in the ${e^+}{e^-}$ decay of excited states in $\mathrm{^8Be} von Hayes-Sterbenz, Anna Catherine, Friar, J. L., Hale, Gerald M., Garvey, Gerald Thomas

Volltext

Reactor neutrino spectral distortions play little role in mass hierarchy experiments von Danielson, D. L., Hayes, A. C., Garvey, G. T.

Volltext

Executive stock options and dynamic risk-taking incentives von Garvey, Gerald T, Mawani, Amin

Volltext

EVA versus Earnings: Does It Matter Which Is More Highly Correlated with Stock Returns? von Garvey, Gerald T., Milbourn, Todd T.

Volltext

Contrarians or momentum chasers? Individual investors’ behavior when trading exchange‐traded funds von Da Dalt, Carlo, Feldman, David, Garvey, Gerald, Westerholm, Peter Joakim

Volltext

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem von Garvey, Gerald T., Mawani, Amin

Volltext

Reactor Neutrino Spectral Distortions Play Little Role in Mass Hierarchy Experiments von Danielson, Daine Lee, Hayes-Sterbenz, Anna Catherine, Garvey, Gerald Thomas

Volltext

Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model von Garvey, Gerald T.

Volltext

Marketable Incentive Contracts and Capital Structure Relevance von GARVEY, GERALD T.

Volltext

A Theory of the Optimal Cost Barrier to Corporate Takeovers von Garvey, Gerald T., Gaston, Noel

Volltext

Message of a (Proud) Mentor von Garvey, Gerald T.

Volltext

Talking down the firm : short-term market manipulation and optimal management compensation / Gerald T. Garvey, Simon Grant, Stephen P. King von Garvey, Gerald T

Volltext bestellen

A model of myopic corporate behavior with efficient stock markets and optimal management incentive contracts / Gerald T. Garvey, Simon Grant, Stephen P. King von Garvey, Gerald T

Volltext bestellen

Implicit labor contracts and the threat of shareholder opportunism : an equilibrium approach / Gerald T. Garvey and Noel G. Gaston von Garvey, Gerald T

Volltext bestellen

Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of “free cash flow”? some evidence von Garvey, Gerald

Volltext