Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information von Forges, Françoise

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Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity von von Stengel, Bernhard, Forges, Francoise

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“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots von Forges, Françoise, Ray, Indrajit

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Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems von Forges, Françoise, Koessler, Frédéric, Salamanca, Andrés

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Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm von Forges, Françoise, Sákovics, József

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Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval von Forges, Françoise, Renault, Jérôme

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Bayesian repeated games and reputation von Salomon, Antoine, Forges, Françoise

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Sender–receiver games with cooperation von Forges, Françoise, Horst, Ulrich

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Afriat's theorem for general budget sets von Forges, Françoise, Minelli, Enrico

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Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists von Eliaz, Kfir, Forges, Françoise

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A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment von Forges, Françoise

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Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games von Forges, Françoise, Horst, Ulrich, Salomon, Antoine

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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values von Biran, Omer, Forges, Françoise

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Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods von Forges, Françoise, Iehlé, Vincent

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Essential data, budget sets and rationalization von Forges, Françoise, Iehlé, Vincent

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INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS (1946–2012) von Forges, Françoise

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Long persuasion games von Forges, Françoise, Koessler, Frédéric

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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case von Forges, Françoise, Vida, Péter

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Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue von Kalai, Ehud, Battaglini, Marco, Charness, Gary, Crawford, Vincent, Forges, Francoise, Parkes, David, Byrd, Jennifer

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Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited von FORGES, Francoise

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