The art of compensation: How hybrid teams solve collective-risk dilemmas von Terrucha, Inês, Fernández Domingos, Elias, C Santos, Francisco, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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Inferring strategies from observations in long iterated Prisoner’s dilemma experiments von Montero-Porras, Eladio, Grujić, Jelena, Fernández Domingos, Elias, Lenaerts, Tom

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Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma von Fernández Domingos, Elias, Terrucha, Inês, Suchon, Rémi, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom

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Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakes von Terrucha, Inês, Fernández Domingos, Elias, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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EGTtools: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python von Fernández Domingos, Elias, Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom

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Modeling behavioral experiments on uncertainty and cooperation with population-based reinforcement learning von Fernández Domingos, Elias, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom

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Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization von Domingos, Elias Fernández, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Kirchsteiger, Georg, Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom

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Emerging Cooperation in N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma over Dynamic Complex Networks von Fernández-Domingos, Elias, Loureiro, Miguel, Álvarez-López, Tamara, Burguillo, Juan C., Covelo, José, Peleteiro, Ana, Byrski, Aleksander

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Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakes von Terrucha, Inês, Domingos, Elias Fernandez, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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The art of compensation : how hybrid teams solve collective-risk dilemmas von Terrucha, Inês, Domingos, Elias Fernandez, Santos, Francisco C, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma von Domingos, Elias Fernandez, Terrucha, Inês, Suchon, Remi, Grujic, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C, Santos, Francisco C, Lenaerts, Tom

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Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources von Montero-Porras, Eladio, Suchon, Rémi, Lenaerts, Tom, Domingos, Elias Fernández

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The art of compensation: how hybrid teams solve collective risk dilemmas von Terrucha, Inês, Domingos, Elias Fernández, Santos, Francisco C, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources von Montero-Porras, Eladio, Suchon, Rémi, Lenaerts, Tom, Elias Fernández Domingos

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Delegation to autonomous agents promotes cooperation in collective-risk dilemmas von Domingos, Elias Fernández, Terrucha, Inês, Suchon, Rémi, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C, Santos, Francisco C, Lenaerts, Tom

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Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization von Domingos, Elias Fernández, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C, Kirchsteiger, Georg, Santos, Francisco C, Lenaerts, Tom

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Experimental data and software for: Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources von Montero-Porras, Eladio

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Delegation to autonomous agents promotes cooperation in collective-risk dilemmas von Domingos, Elias Fernández, Terrucha, Inês, Suchon, Rémi, Grujic, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan Carlo, Santos, Francisco C, Lenaerts, Tom

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Experimental data and software for: Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources von Montero-Porras, Eladio

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The art of compensation: how hybrid teams solve collective risk dilemmas von Terrucha, Inês, Elias Fernández Domingos, Santos, Francisco C, Simoens, Pieter, Lenaerts, Tom

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