Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect von Bowen, T. Renee, Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya

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Optimal group testing with heterogeneous risks von Bobkova, Nina, Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya

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Learning while setting precedents von Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya

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Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty von Agranov, Marina, Eraslan, Hülya, Tergiman, Chloe

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Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining von Eraslan, Hülya, McLennan, Andrew

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Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? von Eraslan, Hülya, Merlo, Antonio

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Dynamic Agenda Setting von Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya

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Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions von Bowen, T. Renee, Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya, Zápal, Jan

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Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals von Bond, Philip, Eraslan, Hülya

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Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players von Eraslan, Hülya

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Informational loss in bundled bargaining von Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya

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AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13 von Eraslan, Hülya, Koşar, Gizem, Li, Wenli, Sarte, Pierre-Daniel

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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information von Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hulya

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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS: ESTIMATES FROM A BARGAINING MODEL von Eraslan, Hülya K. K.

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A Structural Model of Government Formation von Diermeier, Daniel, Eraslan, Hülya, Merlo, Antonio

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İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Diaspora Ermenilerinin Anavatana Geri Dönüş Çağrısını Yeniden Okumak von Eraslan, Hülya

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Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn Model von Eraslan, Hülya

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Information-based trade von Bond, Philip, Eraslan, Hülya

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Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining von Eraslan, Hülya, Merlo, Antonio

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Introduction von Eraslan, Hulya, Nishimura, Kazuo, Yano, Makoto

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