Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions von Dobzinski, S., Nisan, N.

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Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games von Blumrosen, L., Dobzinski, S.

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Multi-unit auctions with budget limits von Dobzinski, Shahar, Lavi, Ron, Nisan, Noam

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On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design von Dobzinski, S., Dughmi, S.

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Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits von Dobzinski, S., Lavi, R., Nisan, N.

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Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents von Dhangwatnotai, P., Dobzinski, S., Dughmi, S., Roughgarden, T.

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Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders von Dobzinski, Shahar

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(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading von Blumrosen, Liad, Dobzinski, Shahar

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Combinatorial Reallocation Mechanisms von Blumrosen, Liad, Dobzinski, Shahar

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Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect von Babaioff, Moshe, Dobzinski, Shahar, Oren, Sigal

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Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts von Dobzinski, Shahar, Nisan, Noam

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On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design von Dobzinski, Shahar, Dughmi, Shaddin

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Economic efficiency requires interaction von Dobzinski, Shahar, Nisan, Noam, Oren, Sigal

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Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions von Cohavi, Keren, Dobzinski, Shahar

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An ultrapotent synthetic nanobody neutralizes SARS-CoV-2 by stabilizing inactive Spike von Schoof, Michael, Faust, Bryan, Saunders, Reuben A, Sangwan, Smriti, Rezelj, Veronica, Hoppe, Nick, Boone, Morgane, Billesbølle, Christian B, Puchades, Cristina, Azumaya, Caleigh M, Kratochvil, Huong T, Zimanyi, Marcell, Deshpande, Ishan, Liang, Jiahao, Dickinson, Sasha, Nguyen, Henry C, Chio, Cynthia M, Merz, Gregory E, Thompson, Michael C, Diwanji, Devan, Schaefer, Kaitlin, Anand, Aditya A, Dobzinski, Niv, Zha, Beth Shoshana, Simoneau, Camille R, Leon, Kristoffer, White, Kris M, Chio, Un Seng, Gupta, Meghna, Jin, Mingliang, Li, Fei, Liu, Yanxin, Zhang, Kaihua, Bulkley, David, Sun, Ming, Smith, Amber M, Rizo, Alexandrea N, Moss, Frank, Brilot, Axel F, Pourmal, Sergei, Trenker, Raphael, Pospiech, Thomas, Gupta, Sayan, Barsi-Rhyne, Benjamin, Belyy, Vladislav, Barile-Hill, Andrew W, Nock, Silke, Liu, Yuwei, Krogan, Nevan J, Ralston, Corie Y, Swaney, Danielle L, García-Sastre, Adolfo, Ott, Melanie, Vignuzzi, Marco, Walter, Peter, Manglik, Aashish

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Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations von Dobzinski, Shahar, Vondrák, Jan

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Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders von Dobzinski, Shahar, Nisan, Noam, Schapira, Michael

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Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? von Dobzinski, Shahar, Mehta, Aranyak, Roughgarden, Tim, Sundararajan, Mukund

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Starvation-Dependent Regulation of Golgi Quality Control Links the TOR Signaling and Vacuolar Protein Sorting Pathways von Dobzinski, Niv, Chuartzman, Silvia G., Kama, Rachel, Schuldiner, Maya, Gerst, Jeffrey E.

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Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms von Ashlagi, Itai, Dobzinski, Shahar, Lavi, Ron

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