MARKET DEFINITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS: THEORY AND PRACTICE von Filistrucchi, L., Geradin, D., van Damme, E., Affeldt, P.

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LYING ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW OR ABOUT WHAT YOU DO? von Serra-Garcia, Marta, Potters, Jan, van Damme, Eric

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Endogenous price leadership von van Damme, Eric, Hurkens, Sjaak

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Supply and demand determine the market value of food providers in wild vervet monkeys von Fruteau, Cécile, Voelkl, Bernhard, van Damme, Eric, Noë, Ronald

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How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior von van Damme, Eric, Binmore, Kenneth G., Roth, Alvin E., Samuelson, Larry, Winter, Eyal, Bolton, Gary E., Ockenfels, Axel, Dufwenberg, Martin, Kirchsteiger, Georg, Gneezy, Uri, Kocher, Martin G., Sutter, Matthias, Sanfey, Alan G., Kliemt, Hartmut, Selten, Reinhard, Nagel, Rosemarie, Azar, Ofer H.

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Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness von Serra-Garcia, Marta, van Damme, Eric, Potters, Jan

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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection von Carlsson, Hans, van Damme, Eric

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Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership von van Damme, Eric, Hurkens, Sjaak

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Liberalizing the Dutch Electricity Market: 1998—2004 von van Damme, Eric

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Infant access and handling in sooty mangabeys and vervet monkeys von Fruteau, Cécile, van de Waal, Erica, van Damme, Eric, Noë, Ronald

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Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria von Damme, Eric van

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Preventing Abuse by Controlling Shareholders: Comment von van Damme, Eric

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Vervet Monkeys Solve a Multiplayer “Forbidden Circle Game” by Queuing to Learn Restraint von Fruteau, Cécile, van Damme, Eric, Noë, Ronald

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The European UMTS-auctions von van Damme, Eric

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Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study von Potters, Jan, Rockenbach, Bettina, Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, van Damme, Eric

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Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities von van Damme, Eric, Weibull, Jörgen W.

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Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring von Bhaskar, V., van Damme, Eric

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Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment von van Damme, Eric, Hurkens, Sjaak

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On the Nash bargaining solution with noise von Güth, Werner, Ritzberger, Klaus, van Damme, Eric

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Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study von Güth, Werner, van Damme, Eric

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