Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics von CORBAE, DEAN, D’ERASMO, PABLO

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CAPITAL BUFFERS IN A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF BANKING INDUSTRY DYNAMICS von Corbae, Dean, D’Erasmo, Pablo

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DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT von D'Erasmo, Pablo, Mendoza, Enrique G.

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Relationship Networks in Banking Around a Sovereign Default and Currency Crisis von D’Erasmo, Pablo, Boedo, Hernán Moscoso, Olivero, María Pía, Sangiácomo, Máximo

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Financial structure, informality and development von D'Erasmo, Pablo N., Moscoso Boedo, Hernan J.

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Politico-economic consequences of rising wage inequality von Corbae, Dean, D’Erasmo, Pablo, Kuruscu, Burhanettin

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Market Exposure and Endogenous Firm Volatility over the Business Cycle von Decker, Ryan A., D'Erasmo, Pablo N., Boedo, Hernan Moscoso

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History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt von D’Erasmo, Pablo, Mendoza, Enrique G.

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Banking regulation with risk of sovereign default von D’Erasmo, Pablo, Livshits, Igor, Schoors, Koen

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Rising bank concentration von Corbae, Dean, D’Erasmo, Pablo

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Measuring climate transition risk at the regional level with an application to community banks von Berlin, Mitchell, Byun, Sung Je, D'Erasmo, Pablo, Yu, Edison

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Foreign Competition and Banking Industry Dynamics: An Application to Mexico von CORBAE, DEAN, D'ERASMO, PABLO

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Misallocation, informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions von D׳Erasmo, Pablo N., Moscoso Boedo, Hernan J., Şenkal, Aslı

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Access to Credit and the Size of the Formal Sector von D’ERASMO, PABLO N.

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DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT: Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model von D'Erasmo, Pablo, Mendoza, Enrique G.

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Replication Banking Regulation with Risk of Sovereign Default (JIE) von D'Erasmo, Pablo

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Replication Banking Regulation with Risk of Sovereign Default (JIE) von D'Erasmo, Pablo

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History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt von D'Erasmo, Pablo, Mendoza, Enrique G

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Are Higher Capital Requirements Worth It? Curbs on bank leverage are intended to prevent bailouts but can slow economic growth. The challenge is to obtain precise estimates of the... von D'Erasmo, Pablo

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Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default von D'Erasmo, Pablo, Mendoza, Enrique G

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