Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions von Chassang, Sylvain, Kawai, Kei, Nakabayashi, Jun, Ortner, Juan

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Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach von Kawai, Kei, Nakabayashi, Jun, Ortner, Juan, Chassang, Sylvain

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Accounting for Behavior in Treatment Effects: New Applications for Blind Trials von Chassang, Sylvain, Snowberg, Erik, Seymour, Ben, Bowles, Cayley

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CALIBRATED INCENTIVE CONTRACTS von Chassang, Sylvain

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Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime von Ortner, Juan, Chassang, Sylvain

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Building routines: Learning, cooperation, and the dynamics of incomplete relational contracts von Chassang, Sylvain

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Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement von Chassang, Sylvain, Ortner, Juan

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Data-driven incentive alignment in capitation schemes von Braverman, Mark, Chassang, Sylvain

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Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments von Chassang, Sylvain, Zehnder, Christian

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BATCHED BANDIT PROBLEMS von Perchet, Vianney, Rigollet, Philippe, Chassang, Sylvain, Snowberg, Erik

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Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection von Kapon, Samuel, Del Carpio, Lucia, Chassang, Sylvain

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Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit von Chassang, Sylvain

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Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability von Chassang, Sylvain, Kapon, Samuel

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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games von Takahashi, Satoru, Chassang, Sylvain

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A Theory of Experimenters: Robustness, Randomization, and Balance von Banerjee, Abhijit V., Chassang, Sylvain, Montero, Sergio, Snowberg, Erik

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Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments von Chassang, Sylvain, Miquel, Gerard Padró i, Snowberg, Erik

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Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences von Chassang, Sylvain, Zehnder, Christian

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Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences: Rewards and punishments von Chassang, Sylvain, Zehnder, Christian

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Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports von CHASSANG, SYLVAIN, PADRÓ I MIQUEL, GERARD

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Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk von Chassang, Sylvain, Miquel, Gerard Padró I

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