The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system von de Mouzon, Olivier, Laurent, Thibault, Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique

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Le scrutin binominal paritaire : un regard d’ingénierie électorale von Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique, Merlin, Vincent, Sauger, Nicolas

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On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties von Le Breton, Michel, Zaporozhets, Vera

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Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective von de Mouzon, Olivier, Laurent, Thibault, Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique

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Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition von Xefteris, Dimitrios, Laussel, Didier, Breton, Michel Le

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Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability von Breton, Michel Le, Sen, Arunava

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Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty von Breton, Michel Le, Zaporozhets, Vera

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The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting von Gehrlein, William, Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique

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The stability threshold and two facets of polarization von Haimanko, Ori, Le Breton, Michel, Weber, Shlomo

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The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession von Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton, Michel Le Breton

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On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location von De Donder, Philippe, Le Breton, Michel, Peluso, Eugenio

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Sequential legislative lobbying von Le Breton, Michel, Sudhölter, Peter, Zaporozhets, Vera

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Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets von Le Breton, Michel, Weber, Shlomo

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Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability von Haimanko, Ori, Le Breton, Michel, Weber, Shlomo

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Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures von Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, Matthew O., Le Breton, Michel

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Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian von Epstein, Larry G., Le Breton, Michel

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Choquet Rationality von Ghirardato, Paolo, Le Breton, Michel

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Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique von Le Breton, Michel, Van Der Straeten, Karine

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Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820 von Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique

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Stability of Jurisdiction Structures under the Equal Share and Median Rules von Bogomolnaia, Anna, Le Breton, Michel, Savvateev, Alexei, Weber, Shlomo

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