Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions von Amanatidis, Georgios, Aziz, Haris, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Li, Bo, Moulin, Hervé, Voudouris, Alexandros A., Wu, Xiaowei

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Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Hollender, Alexandros, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

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Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

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A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

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Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

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A simple deterministic algorithm for symmetric submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos

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Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Fusco, Federico, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca

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Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca

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On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos

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Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games von Birmpas, Georgios, Gan, Jiarui, Hollender, Alexandros, Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco J., Rajgopal, Ninad, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

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Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains von Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos, Schäfer, Guido

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Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction von Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos, Telelis, Orestis, Tsikiridis, Artem

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Fair Division with Interdependent Values von Birmpas, Georgios, Ezra, Tomer, Leonardi, Stefano, Russo, Matteo

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Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction von Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos, Telelis, Orestis, Tsikiridis, Artem

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Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Fusco, Federico, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca

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Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos

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Decentralized Update Selection with Semi-strategic Experts von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Lazos, Philip, Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco

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Fairness and Efficiency in DAG-Based Cryptocurrencies von Birmpas, Georgios, Koutsoupias, Elias, Lazos, Philip, Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco J.

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Algorithmically Fair Maximization of Multiple Submodular Objective Functions von Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca

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Reward Schemes and Committee Sizes in Proof of Stake Governance von Birmpas, Georgios, Lazos, Philip, Markakis, Evangelos, Penna, Paolo

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