Bargaining in biology von BINMORE, K

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Why Experiment in Economics? von Binmore, Ken

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Game theory and institutions von Binmore, Ken

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THE BIGGEST AUCTION EVER: THE SALE OF THE BRITISH 3G TELECOM LICENCES von Binmore, Ken, Klemperer, Paul

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Economic man – or straw man? von Binmore, Ken

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How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior von van Damme, Eric, Binmore, Kenneth G., Roth, Alvin E., Samuelson, Larry, Winter, Eyal, Bolton, Gary E., Ockenfels, Axel, Dufwenberg, Martin, Kirchsteiger, Georg, Gneezy, Uri, Kocher, Martin G., Sutter, Matthias, Sanfey, Alan G., Kliemt, Hartmut, Selten, Reinhard, Nagel, Rosemarie, Azar, Ofer H.

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Interpersonal comparison in egalitarian societies von Binmore, Ken

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The evolution of focal points von Binmore, Ken, Samuelson, Larry

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Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study von Binmore, K., Shaked, A., Sutton, J.

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Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection von Binmore, Ken, Samuelson, Larry

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A Backward Induction Experiment von Binmore, Ken, McCarthy, John, Ponti, Giovanni, Samuelson, Larry, Shaked, Avner

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Suicidal punishment in the ant Acromyrmex versicolor von Pollock, G B, Cabrales, A, Rissing, S W, Binmore, K G

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Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection von Binmore, Ken, Samuelson, Larry

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Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets von Binmore, K. G., Herrero, M. J.

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Evolutionary Social Theory: Reply to Robert Sugden von Binmore, Ken

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Equilibrium selection in bargaining models von Binmore, Ken, Samuelson, Larry, Young, Peyton

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Cooperation should not be assumed von McNamara, John M., Binmore, Ken, Houston, Alasdair I.

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Defending Transitivity against Zeno's Paradox von BINMORE, KEN, VOORHOEVE, ALEX

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Guillermo owen's proof of the minimax theorem von BINMORE, Ken

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Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study von Binmore, Ken, Swierzbinski, Joe, Proulx, Chris

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