Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium von Balseiro, Santiago R., Gur, Yonatan

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Static Routing in Stochastic Scheduling: Performance Guarantees and Asymptotic Optimality von Balseiro, Santiago R., Brown, David B., Chen, Chen

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Survey of Dynamic Resource-Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis von Balseiro, Santiago R., Besbes, Omar, Pizarro, Dana

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The Best of Many Worlds: Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems von Balseiro, Santiago R., Lu, Haihao, Mirrokni, Vahab

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Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions von Choi, Hana, Mela, Carl F., Balseiro, Santiago R., Leary, Adam

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Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility von Balseiro, Santiago R., Besbes, Omar, Castro, Francisco

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Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products von Balseiro, Santiago R., Désir, Antoine

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Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design von Balseiro, Santiago R., Besbes, Omar, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

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Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange von Balseiro, Santiago R., Feldman, Jon, Mirrokni, Vahab, Muthukrishnan, S.

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Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money von Balseiro, Santiago R., Gurkan, Huseyin, Sun, Peng

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Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks von Balseiro, Santiago R., Brown, David B., Chen, Chen

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On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design von Balseiro, Santiago R., Kim, Anthony, Russo, Daniel

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Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising von Balseiro, Santiago R., Candogan, Ozan

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Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best von Balseiro, Santiago R., Mirrokni, Vahab, Leme, Renato Paes, Zuo, Song

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Multistage Intermediation in Display Advertising von Balseiro, Santiago R., Candogan, Ozan, Gurkan, Huseyin

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Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities von Balseiro, Santiago R., Mirrokni, Vahab S., Leme, Renato Paes

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Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality von Balseiro, Santiago R, Brown, David B

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Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment von Balseiro, Santiago R, Besbes, Omar, Weintraub, Gabriel Y

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On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design von Anunrojwong, Jerry, Balseiro, Santiago R., Besbes, Omar

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Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability von Balmaceda, Felipe, Balseiro, Santiago R., Correa, José R., Stier-Moses, Nicolás E.

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