Non-vetoed matching with status quo von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Dorm augmented college assignments von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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A task-allocation problem von Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz

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Sticky matching in school choice von Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz, Aliog̃ulları, Zeynel Harun, Barlo, Mehmet

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When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful? von Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz, Dur, Umut Mert

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Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert

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A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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Corrigendum to “Some further properties of the cumulative offer process” [Games Econ. Beh. 104 (2017) 656–665] von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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College admissions with tuition transfers von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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School choice with hybrid schedules von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert, Harris, William

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Group robust stability in matching markets von Afacan, Mustafa Oguz

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Characterizations of the cumulative offer process von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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On relationships between substitutes conditions von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, Turhan, Bertan

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Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Hu, Gaoji, Li, Jiangtao

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Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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Rawlsian Matching von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut

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Enrollment manipulations in school choice von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Capacity design in school choice von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut, Van der Linden, Martin

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