Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert

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School choice with hybrid schedules von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert, Harris, William

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College admissions with tuition transfers von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Hu, Gaoji, Li, Jiangtao

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Non-vetoed matching with status quo von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Rawlsian Matching von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut

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Numerical simulation for fractional optimal control problems via euler wavelets von Turan Dincel, Arzu, Tural-Polat, Sadiye Nergis, Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

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Strategy-proof popular mechanisms von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Bó, Inácio

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Dorm augmented college assignments von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible? von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut

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Parallel markets in school choice von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Evdokimov, Piotr, Hakimov, Rustamdjan, Turhan, Bertan

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Capacity design in school choice von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut, Van der Linden, Martin

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Assignment maximization von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Bó, Inácio, Turhan, Bertan

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Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Salman, Umutcan

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Incompatibility between stability and consistency von Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert

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Corrigendum to “Some further properties of the cumulative offer process” [Games Econ. Beh. 104 (2017) 656–665] von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Characterizations of the cumulative offer process von Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz

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Group robust stability in matching markets von Afacan, Mustafa Oguz

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